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CHOOSING HOW SAFE IS ENOUGH: INCREASED
ANTITERRORIST FEDERAL ACTIVITY AND ITS EFFECT
ON THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND THE
AIRPORT/AIRLINE INDUSTRY
MICHAEL J. AuBUCHON*
"We must choose between freedom and fear-we cannot have
both."
-Justice William 0. Douglas, United States Supreme Court1
I. INTRODUCTION
MANY AMERICANS fear the United States can never be
completely safe from terrorism. 2 This apprehension is
likely fueled by a recent wave of terrorist activity on American
soil, such as the bombings of the World Trade Center and the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.' The
Oklahoma City bombing spurred federal action increasing se-
curity standards at federal buildings susceptible to a terrorist at-
tack.4 The increased security measures include: control over
* J.D., Drake University Law School, Des Moines, Iowa; B.S., Aviation Sciences,
with honors, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma. The author
would like to dedicate this Article to the 230 individuals who perished on TWA
Flight 800 and their families. He would also like to thank Douglas W. Nelms,
Associate Editor, Air Transport World, for his contribution to this Article.
1 Nadine Strossen, Check Your Luggage and Liberties at the Gate, INTELLECTUAL
CAPITAL (Aug. 7, 1997) <http://www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/97/0807/
icopinionsl.asp> (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 270 (1961)
(Douglas, J. dissenting; ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THE BLESSiNGS OF LIBERTY 156
(1956)).
2 See CBS News Poll, July 29, 1996. Of those surveyed, 93% stated the United
States would never be completely safe from terrorism, 5% declared it was possible
for the United States to be completely safe from a terrorist attack, and 2% did not
answer. See id.
3 The April 19, 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City killed 168 men, women, and
children. See John M. Goshko & Scott Bowles, New Security Measures Ordered by
President; Federal Facilities to Get Stricter Controls, WASH. POST, June 29, 1995, at Al.
4 See id., at A18.
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parking adjacent to government buildings, shatterproof glass for
windows, closed-circuit television monitoring, enhanced em-
ployee and visitor identification, and reconsideration of where
best to place day care centers for employees' children.5 The es-
timated cost of the increased security measures, assuming fed-
eral government buildings totally lack security features, is
estimated at one billion dollars.6
As a reaction to domestic terrorism, Congress passed the An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),7
an attempt to alleviate terrorism concerns in the general public
in the wake of the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City
bombings. The AEDPA, signed by President Clinton a little
more than a year after the Oklahoma City bombing,8 sought: "to
deter terrorism," ".to prevent persons within the United
States ... from providing material support or resources to for-
eign organizations that engage in terrorists activities," and to
amend numerous acts to prevent and punish acts of terrorism.9
Some civil libertarians have attacked as constitutionally unsound
the increased monitoring and control powers the AEDPA gives
the federal government in regulating potential terrorist activi-
ties, largely because of alleged freedom of association issues sur-




7 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.,
and 22 U.S.C.). This Article focuses on the area of the AEDPA that has raised the
most constitutional concern: the establishment of procedures to prevent fun-
draising for the benefit of "foreign terrorist organizations." See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
(1996).
8 See David G. Savage, Anti-Terrorism Legislation Wins Approval in House; Congress:
The 293-113 Vote Sends Compromise Measure to Clinton, Who Is Expected to Sign it De-
spite Concerns By Civil Libertarians, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1996, at A16. For a discus-
sion of specific AEDPA provisions, see infra Part II.A.
" Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 preamble and § 301, Stat. 1214, 1247 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 22 U.S. C.).
10 See generally David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing A Reign of Terror: Civil
Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. Crry U. L. REv. 247 (1996)
(scrutinizing the constitutionality of the AEDPA and pre-AEDPA proposed legis-
lation). See infra Part II.B.1. for further AEDPA constitutional criticisms. But see
Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109 HARv. L. REv. 2074 (1996)
[hereinafter Blown Away?] (defending the AEDPA's constitutional viability). See
infra Part II.B.2. for further AEDPA constitutional justifications.
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Americans' general fear of terrorism could be viewed to ex-
tend to air travel.11 This anxiety received increased attention
after the July 1996 midair explosion of Trans World Airlines
(TWA) Flight 800 off the coast of Long Island.12 Immediately
after the TWA crash, President Clinton appointed Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore to form the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security (Gore Commission). 13 Among other direc-
tives, including examination of the air traffic control system, the
Gore Commission was created by President Clinton "to look at
the changing security threat" in the aviation industry. 4 While
the Gore Commission admittedly was assigned to address many
issues, the focus on aviation security, " [i] n the wake of concerns
over the crash of Trans World Airlines Flight 800," was apparent
through President Clinton's request for an initial report on avia-
tion security within forty-five days of the commission's forma-
tion.1 5 The commission's final report recommended increased
funding for innovative, bomb-detecting security systems in air-
ports nationwide, with cost not being dispositive.16 Additionally,
the Gore Commission recommended complementing the inno-
vative security systems with a system of automated passenger pro-
H See CBS News Poll, July 21, 1996. Of those surveyed, 49% stated that hi-
jacking and terrorism were the largest danger to air travelers, 44% declared air-
line accidents posed the largest threats, 5% said the threats were equal, and 3%
did not answer. See id. Given the data compiled in this poll, one might believe
Americans' alleged fear of terrorism would result in less opposition to increased
federal activity in aviation security. However, the July 21, 1996, CBS poll was
taken merely four days after the July 17th explosion of TWA Flight 800. Compare
David Jackson, FBI Head Says Finance Probe Has Expanded; Freeh Also Calls Terrorism
Unlikely in TWA Crash, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 5, 1997, at IA, with CBS News
Poll, July 21, 1996 (noting the date of the crash and the date of the poll). It is
possible the public's fear of aviation terrorism stemmed from many news ac-
counts pinpointing terrorism as the cause of the crash. See, e.g., Don Phillips,
FAA Advisory Panel Reviewing Aviation Security, WASH. POST, July 23, 1996, at A9.
12 See Jackson, supra note 11, at IA. The disaster killed all 230 people on
board. See id.
13 See Douglas W. Nelms, Shifting Targets: The Changing Face of Terrorism is Rede-
fining How the U.S. Looks at Airport/Airline Protection, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Feb.
1, 1997, at 29. See WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY,
FINAL REPORT (1997), <http://www.aviationcommission.dot.gov212fin~l.html>
[hereinafter GORE COMMISSION].
14 GoRE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 3.
15 Id.
16 See WHITE HOUSE COMM'N ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY: A DEP'T OF
TRANSP. STATUS REPORT PRESENTED TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP.
NEws RELEASE (July, 1997) at 7 available 1197 WL 399309 [hereinafter DOT NEWS
RELEASE].
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filing.17 Civil libertarians have criticized the Gore Commission's
recommendations as violating various constitutional rights,
while airports, airlines, and aviation scholars have attacked them
as costly."8
This Article argues that Americans should choose to retain
their freedoms associated with air travel in lieu of apprehen-
sively regulating a safeguarded aviation security infrastructure.
While increased federal antiterrorism measures, legislative or
otherwise, are appropriate in some contexts, such measures lack
legitimacy when they are earmarked for an industry adequately
monitoring potential terrorist activity. While the AEDPA might
be appropriate in the wake of the World Trade Center and
Oklahoma City bombings to decrease the threat of terrorism to
the unguarded general public, increased regulation of the air-
port/airline infrastructure is largely unneeded. This Article
stresses that a similar need to regulate is not present because
airports and airlines have security measures in place that protect
against an extremely unlikely terrorist event; additionally, such
security regulation of the aviation infrastructure is financially
burdensome to the already heavily regulated airport/airline in-
17 See id. at 8. Passenger profiling screens passengers to pinpoint those who
might present a terrorism threat. See Sonya Ross, Panel Recommends Passenger Pro-
filing to Reduce Terrorism Threat, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 12, 1997, available in 1997
WL 2499750. Profiling involves the use of computers to scan criminal records of
passengers as well as passengers' travel history. See id. A passenger's travel history,
obtained from the airline's database, and various other computer-encrypted data,
obtained from the FBI, CIA, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, com-
bine to produce the passenger profile. See Nelms, supra note 14, at 34.
Ns For a civil liberties criticism, see Strossen, supra note 1, at 1. Nadine Stros-
sen, ACLU President and law professor at New York Law School, voices the civil
libertarian's concern that the government, through implementation of security
measures recommended by the Gore Commission, has unconstitutionally
usurped freedoms the flying public enjoys "in the name of the terrorism bogey-
man." Id. "Our own government thus victimizes its own people precisely the way
that the dreaded international terrorists would: by constricting our free Ameri-
can way of life." Id.; see infra Part III.B. for further discussion of the Gore Com-
mission and civil liberties. For a cost criticism, see Nelms, supra note 14, at 33.
Doug Nelms, an AIR TRANSPORT WORLD columnist, believes that the federal gov-
ernment should be directing more funds towards making aircraft safer mechani-
cally rather than focusing on aviation security. See Telephone Interview with
Douglas W. Nelms, Associate Editor, Air Transport World (Feb. 6, 1998) (on file
with author). Nelms describes the government's effort to heighten security, via
the Gore Commission's recommendations, as making the already "hard target"-
aircraft on which bombs could be placed-into a "harder target." Id. See infra
Part III.C. for further discussion of the Gore Commission and cost.
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dustry.'9 Choosing the right context in which to implement fed-
eral antiterrorist measures plays a central role in the freedom-
freedom from both unreasonable constraints of liberties and
burdensome economic constraints-that defines our American
way of life.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the AEDPA, with a par-
ticular emphasis on its alleged constitutional shortcomings re-
garding freedom of association issues surrounding the
prohibition of "foreign terrorist organizations." Part III, the fo-
cus of this Article, begins by addressing the increased govern-
mental involvement in combating terrorism in the aviation
infrastructure through bomb-screening devices, passenger pro-
filing, and passenger-bag matching. The constitutional implica-
tions of that increased involvement will be examined where
applicable. An analysis of the various costs imposed on the avia-
tion infrastructure and the traveling public, through increased
governmental involvement, concludes Part III. Part IV summa-
rizes and concludes this Article.
II. FEDERAL ANTITERRORISM SCHEMES AIMED AT
PROTECTING THE GENERAL PUBLIC
A. BACKGROUND OF AEDPA
After several series of modified versions, the AEDPA was
signed into law by President Clinton on April 24, 1996, a year
and five days after the Oklahoma City bombing.20 Some com-
mentators were worried that the rushed attempt to enact antiter-
rorism legislation would lead to a backlash against personal
liberties, including severe consequences aimed at those making
contributions to groups deemed "foreign terrorist organiza-
tions. ' 21 Primarily, the AEDPA expanded the federal govern-
ment's ability to monitor fundraising for foreign groups
19 "Even the [Gore] Commission recognizes that '[a]lthough the threat of ter-
rorism is increasing, the danger of an individual becoming a victim of a terrorist
attack-let alone an aircraft bombing-will doubtless remain very small."' Rob-
ert W. Hahn, The Cost of Airport Security Measures, CONSUMERS' RESEARCH MAGA-
ZINE, July 1997, at 16 (citing GORE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 13).
20 See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Signs Measure on Terrorism and Death Penalty Ap-
peals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1996, at A18; see also Savage supra note 8, at A16.
21 See generally Kopel & Olson, supra note 10, at 248 (arguing that "bigger fed-
eral government and a narrower interpretation of the Constitution" often lead to
a restriction of civil liberties after "sensational crimes" like the Oklahoma City
bombing).
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suspected by the government of furthering terrorism.22 Once
the Secretary of Treasury, in conjunction with the Secretary of
State, deems a foreign organization a "foreign terrorist organiza-
tion," any contribution to that group is unlawful. 23  Dropped
from the AEDPA were provisions which would have given the
FBI and other federal law enforcement agents increased wire-
tapping capabilities. 24 Because of these omissions, the final ver-
sion of the Act was much less combative of terrorism than
22 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 303, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (1996)). The
principal aspect of the AEDPA is the fundraising provision in relevant part:
(a) Prohibited activities.-
(1) Unlawful conduct.-Whoever, within the United States or sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides ma-
terial support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(2) Financial institutions.-Except as authorized by the Secretary,
any financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession
of, or control over, any funds in which a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion, or its agent, has an interest, shall-
(A) retain possession of, or maintain control over, such funds; and
(B) report to the Secretary the existence of such funds in accord-
ance with regulations issued by the Secretary.
(b) Civil penalty.-Any financial institution that knowingly fails to
comply with subsection (a)(2) shall be subject to a civil penalty in
an amount that is the greater of-
(A) $50,000 per violation; or
(B) twice the amount of which the financial institution was re-
quired under subsection (a) (2) to retain possession or control....
(g) Definitions. As used in this section- . . .
(5) the term "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Treasury; and
(6) the term "terrorist organization" means an organization desig-
nated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1189.].
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a), (g) (1996). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (1), the Secretary of
Treasury, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, may designate an organiza-
tion as a "foreign terrorist organization" if "the Secretary finds that-(A) the or-
ganization is a foreign organization; (B) the organization engages in terrorist
activity (as defined in section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title); and (C) the terrorist
activity of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or
the national security of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)-(C) (West.
Supp. 1998). This Article, when discussing the AEDPA, focuses primarily on the
foreign contributions aspect of the law and the deletion of increased law enforce-
ment provisions from earlier versions.
2-1 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a).
24 Compare H.R. 1710, 104h Cong. § 301 (a) (3)(1995) and S. 735, 10 4th Cong.
§ 511 (a) (1995) with Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, tit. III, Stat. 1214.
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President Clinton had hoped.25 Consequently, after signing the
AEDPA into law, President Clinton promised more stringent an-
titerrorism proposals in the future.26
B. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF AEDPA
1. Constitutional Criticisms
David Kopel, Associate Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute in
Washington, D.C., and Joseph Olson, Professor of Law at Ham-
line University, have argued that the AEDPA has constitutional
infirmities, including its alleged infringement on the freedoms
of speech and association.27 These scholars argue that the gov-
ernment's ability to monitor fundraising for foreign groups sus-
pected of terrorism invokes the protected freedom of
association under the First Amendment.28 Kopel and Olson are
especially critical of the prohibition of support for lawful nonvi-
olent activities by any group that the Secretary of Treasury, in
conjunction with the Secretary of State, designates a "foreign
terrorist organization. ' '29 For example, Kopel and Olson argue
that, under the AEDPA's enforcement, a donor to an Irish Re-
publican Army (IRA) orphanage would be a federal criminal be-
cause the IRA would be deemed a "foreign terrorist
organization" by the Secretary of Treasury in conjunction with
the Secretary of State. 0 To Kopel and Olson, "felonizing chari-
table donations to foreign humanitarian causes . . . will make
America more dangerous, not safer[,] . . ." because "[r]eleasing
25 See Roberta Smith, America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: The United
States Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law
and International Response, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 249, 268 (1997).
26 See id.
27 See generally Kopel & Olson, supra note 10, at 278 (arguing that "[i]n the
terrorism bill signed by the President, the statutory protection of First Amend-
ment rights was eliminated").
28 See id. at 278-82. "The Constitution mandates that if a person is to be pun-
ished for association with a group which has unlawful objectives, the government
must prove that the individual specifically intended to further the unlawful objec-
tives." Id. at 281 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)). A First Amend-
ment attack has also surfaced from scholars who claim the provisions allowing for
deportation of aliens based on their associations, speech, and donations pose
constitutional problems. See Robert Plotkin, First Amendment Challenges to the Mem-
bership and Advocacy Provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 623, 653 (1996).
29 Kopel & Olson, supra note 10, at 278-79 (analyzing Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 22 U.S.C.).
30 Id. at 280.
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the federal government from the strict Constitutional rule of law
would, in the long run, facilitate state terrorism."'"
2. Constitutional Justifications
Despite its freedom of association criticism, the AEDPA has
been supported for its constitutionality and viability. 2 One
source, in direct opposition to Kopel and Olson, states that " [i] n
its haste to enact something by the one-year anniversary of the
Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed a weak shadow of the
original bills, which responds too broadly to earlier charges of
extremism and is likely to do little to stop terrorism. ' 33 As to the
prohibition on fundraising, this source, unlike Kopel and Ol-
son, contends that speech of terrorist organizations and their
supporters, while somewhat political in nature, is unprotected
because of the element of violent incitement.34 This source ex-
plains that the government's interest in banning this type of
speech is much greater than its ban on other types of politically
motivated speech. 5 In this regard, supporters of the AEDPA's
constitutionality draw a distinction between financial support to
terrorist organizations and financial contributions to political
candidates or parties.3 6 The proponents of the AEDPA also sup-
port increased law enforcement activity as a necessary measure
to dilute the threat of terrorism. 7
III. FEDERAL ANTITERRORISM SCHEMES AIMED AT
PROTECTING THE AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURE
A. BACKGROUND OF THE GORE COMMISSION
RECOMMENDATIONS
The crash of TWA Flight 800 set in motion increased federal
involvement to make the aviation infrastructure safer.3 ' This
31 Id. at 346.
32 See generally Blown Away ?, supra note 10, at 2075-76 (arguing "that most of the
initial legislative [pre-AEDPA] proposals were reasonable and constitutional re-
sponses to the threat of terrorism" and "that subsequent amendments may have
removed too much of the initial substance for the law to be effective in combat-
ing terrorism").
33 Id. at 2091.
34 See id. at 2081 (discussing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
,5 See id. at 2081.
'16 See id.
37 See id. at 2089-90.
38 See Faye Bowers, Winnowing Down the Theories, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July
16, 1997, at 3.
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federal involvement was likely prompted by a rash of media re-
ports alluding to terrorism as the cause of the accident." FBI
Director Louis Freeh, members of the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), and Justice Department officials now be-
lieve a massive mechanical failure is the most likely cause of the
crash.4 ° In an FBI briefing to the media, Assistant FBI Director
James Kallstrom stated, "We must now report that no evidence
has been found which would indicate that a criminal act was the
cause of the tragedy of TWA Flight 800."'l
Although the cause of the crash is officially unknown, the
NTSB theorizes that a spark from some source ignited the
highly explosive 'let A" fuel vapor contained in the center-wing
fuel tank of the Boeing 747.42 While a decision on a probable
cause was expected by the end of 1998, NTSB Chairman James
E. Hall, during the December 1997 TWA Flight 800 NTSB Hear-
ings, stated that no trace evidence of a bomb or missile was
found on the wreckage.4 3 With the investigation leaning to-
wards a mechanical failure theory, questions regarding the Gore
Commission's legitimacy and the need for increased airport/air-
line security are being raised.44
The Gore Commission was formed immediately following the
crash of TWA Flight 8004' by Executive Order 13015 and was
assigned the task of setting forth recommendations "to enhance
and ensure the continued safety and security of [the] air trans-
portation system."46 The Gore Commission's final report re-
39 See Don Phillips, FAA Advisory Panel Reviewing Aviation Security, WASH. POST,
July 23, 1996, at A9; Carrie Dowling & Paul Leavitt, Explosion Brings Fears of Terror-
ism, USA TODAY, July 18, 1996, at 3A.
40 See Jackson, supra note 11, at IA.
41 FBI Report on Crash of TWA Hight #800 (C-SPAN television broadcast, Nov. 18,
1997) (videotape on file with the author).
42 See Frank J. Murray, Kin 'May Never Know' Cause of 7WA 800 Crash; NTSB Chief
Takes Solace in Safety Gains, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1997, at Al.
43 See id.
- The Gore Commission's legitimacy is being questioned because it was
formed to respond to an assumed cause of the TWA Flight 800 disaster. That
assumption has been refuted. See supra note 42. Even though the FAA and NTSB
have determined that the cause was mechanical, the recommendations are cur-
rently being imposed on the flying public. See Hahn, supra note 20, at 15; Gil
Klein, Quietly, Antiterrorist Systems Starting Up, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 24, 1997, at 7;
Dave Knibb & Karen Walker, Blood, Sweat, and Gore: Workability of Gore Commission
Recommendations Probed, AIRLINE Bus., April 1, 1997, at 40.
45 See Nelms, supra note 14, at 29.
46 GoRE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 1; see also DOT NEws RELEASE, supra
note 17, at 7. The Gore Commission's fifty-seven final recommendations
included:
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vealed that the impetus behind its formation was the crash of
1.5. Cost alone should not become dispositive in deciding aviation
safety and security rulemaking issues....
3.1. The federal government should consider aviation security as a
national security issue, and provide substantial funding for capital
improvements...
3.2. The FAA should establish federally mandated standards for se-
curity enhancements....
3.5. The FAA should implement a comprehensive plan to address
the threat of explosives and other threat objects in cargo and work
with industry to develop new initiatives in this area...
3.6. The FAA should establish a security system that will provide a
high level of protection for all aviation information systems...
3.7. The FAA should work with airlines and airport consortia to
ensure that all passengers are positively identified and subjected to
security procedures before they board aircraft....
3.9. Assess the possible use of chemical and biological weapons as
tools of terrorism...
3.10. The FAA should work with industry to develop a national pro-
gram to increase the professionalism of the aviation security
workforce, including screening personnel...
3.11. Access to airport controlled areas must be secured and the
physical security of aircraft must be ensured...
3.12. Establish consortia at all commercial airports to implement
enhancements to aviation safety and security...
3.13. Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action
plans...
3.14. Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint
checks for all screeners, and all airport and airline employees with
access to secure areas...
3.15. Deploy existing technology...
3.16. Establish a joint government-industry research and develop-
ment program...
3.17. Establish an interagency task force to assess the potential use
of surface-to-air missiles against commercial aircraft...
3.18. Significantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs...
3.19. Complement technology with automated passenger
profiling...
3.20. Certify screening companies and improve screener
performance...
3.21. Aggressively test existing security systems...
3.22. Use the Customs Service to enhance security...
3.23. Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel
access to the classified information they need to know...
3.24. Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match...
3.26. Improve passenger manifests ....
GORE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 6-25. This Article focuses on four of the
stated recommendations: 3.1., 3.15., 3.19., and 3.24.
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TWA Flight 800."7 These recommendations are now being im-
plemented by the FAA nationwide.48
B. CONSTITUTIONAL AND GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE GORE
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS
Attacks on the Gore Commission's recommendations have
come from several fronts.49 One such front includes scholars
concerned about constitutional problems associated with the
use of state-of-the-art bomb-screening technology."° Invasion of
privacy issues have surfaced because some of the bomb-screen-
ers enable the operator to see through a person's clothing to his
or her naked body.51
The Gore Commission's recommended use of passenger pro-
filing5 2 perhaps gives rise to the most heated constitutional de-
bate stemming from the Commission's final report.5" Other
privacy interests could be violated through passenger profiling,
such as the right not to have a criminal record exposed to
nongovernment aviation personnel. 4 Moreover, the use of
profiles can potentially single out an individual in a discrimina-
tory manner; for example, a profile would be discriminatory if it
unfoundedly singled out Arab or Muslim Americans as a group
47 See id. at 3. The report stated:
In the wake of concerns over the crash of Trans World Airlines
Flight 800, President Clinton asked the Commission to focus its at-
tention first on the issue of security. He asked for an initial re-
port . . . including an action plan to deploy new high-technology
machines to detect the most sophisticated explosives.
Id.
48 See Klein, supra note 45, at 7.
49 SeeJames A. Hooper, ACLU May Challenge Passenger Profiles, FLA. TODAY, Mar.
9, 1997, at 10A; Nelms, supra note 14 at 30; Donna Rosato, U.S. Airlines to Start
Profiling, Bag Matching, USA TODAY, July 10, 1997, at 1A.
50 See Strossen, supra note 1, at 1-2. Strossen states that the remote chance of a
terrorist attack supports her argument. See id. at 2. She points out that, "the
chance that any passenger will die en route for any reason is only 1 in 8 million,
making flying 100 times safer than driving." Id.
51 See Nelms, supra note 14, at 30. See infra Part III.B.1. for further discussion
of bomb-screening equipment and its privacy implications.
52 See Ross, supra note 18, at 5; Nelms, supra note 14, at 34.
53 See Tiffany Danitz, Snooping on Passengers Under FAA's Watchful Eye, INSIGHT
MAG., Mar. 31, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9711043. But see Gore Commission Propos-
als Are A Mixed Bag, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 24, 1997, at 82 (arguing
that the Gore Commission offered many guidelines to ensure that civil liberties
are not violated).
54 See Ross, supra note 18, at 5.
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more likely to pose a terrorist threat.55 Like passenger profiling
criticisms from civil libertarians, the Gore Commission's sug-
gested use of passenger-bag matching technology has also been
criticized by airport and airline officials as impractical and likely
to cause significant delays in the aviation infrastructure.56
1. Bomb-Screening Equipment
Gore Commission Recommendation 3.15 urges that state-of-
the-art bomb-screening technology be employed to minimize
potential terrorist threats.57 The recommendation states that
"[n]ew developments such as computerized systems with high
resolution digital displays, innovative use of color to highlight
threat objects, and ability to accommodate technologies such as
threat image projection to maintain screener performance, can
provide enhanced security.
51 8
Unlike the constitutional issues raised in passenger profiling,
the civil liberties concerns involving the use of heightened
bomb-screening technology were not addressed by the Gore
Commission. 5  Some experts have described the new state-of-
the-art bomb-screening equipment proposed in the Gore Com-
mission as subjecting individuals to a "virtual strip search," thus
raising potential invasion of privacy issues. 60 The Gore Commis-
sion's final report has been criticized by those who believe there
is absolutely no limit on the type of bomb-screening equipment
that may be used.61 One such device is manufactured by Ameri-
55 See Donna Abu-Nasr, Arab and Muslim Americans Say Profiling Discriminates
Against Them, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4875401. See
infra Part III.B.2. for further discussion of passenger profiling and its privacy and
civil liberties implications.
56 See Nelms, supra note 14, at 33.
57 GORE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 17.
58 Id.
5) See id. at 17, 19.
60 Strossen, supra note 1, at 2. Strossen argues:
As a frequent flyer and civil libertarian, I already suffer embarrass-
ment and outrage when an airport security official scrutinizes-in
full view of other passengers-the TV monitor with the projected
image of the contents of my carry-on baggage. I can hardly imag-
ine enduring a comparable scrutiny of the projected image of my
body. And my concerns are heightened by a [feature on one
bomb-screening device] of which its producers are particularly
proud: a joystick-driven ZOOM option, which allows the operator
to enlarge selected portions of the image. I am a privacy buff.
Therefore I do not want to travel-in effect-in the buff.
Id. at 2.
61 See id. at 1-2.
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can Science and Engineering Company and is actually in use at
one foreign airport.62 The machine can produce images of an
individual's private bodily areas, as well as reveal private condi-
tions, ranging from mastectomies to catheter tubes. 3 Use of
this type of bomb-screening technology could expose airports
and airlines to invasion of privacy litigation and might pose sig-
nificant public relations problems for them as well.64
2. Passenger Profiling System
Gore Commission Recommendation 3.19 suggests that pas-
senger profiling systems be used to identify potential terrorists.65
The Commission recommended three steps be implemented
[t]o improve and promote passenger profiling[:] First, FBI, CIA,
and BATF [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] should
evaluate and expand the research into known terrorists, hijack-
ers, and bombers needed to develop the best possible profiling
system. They should keep in mind that such a profile would be
most useful to the airlines if it could be matched against auto-
mated passenger information which the airlines maintain. Sec-
ond, the FBI and CIA should develop a system that would allow
important intelligence information on known or suspected ter-
rorists to be used in passenger profiling without compromising
the integrity of the intelligence or its sources. Third, the Com-
mission will establish an advisory board on civil liberties ques-
tions that arise from the development and use of profiling
systems.
66
Perhaps the greatest drawbacks regarding passenger profiling
are the civil liberties and discrimination issues the Gore Com-
mission clearly recognized.67 Despite this governmental recog-
62 See id. ("American Science and Engineering Company is now promoting its
'BodySearch' Contraband Detection System, which can reveal such personally
private areas and information as breasts and penises, and their relative
dimensions.").
63 See id.
64 See Nelms, supra note 14, at 30.
65 GORE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 18.
66 Id. at 19.
67 See Profile System Still Being Developed, but Limits Urged, ASSOCIATED PREss, Feb.
12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4856039; Stephen Franklin, Fitting the Terrorist Pro-
file: Which One Would You Stop and Search?, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 1997, at 1. The
Commission, by ensuring Department of Justice monitoring of passenger profil-
ing, "clearly recognized" the potential that a profiling system could have the ef-
fect of selecting individuals based on national origin, racial, ethnic, religious, or
gender characteristics. See GORE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 19. Moreover, by
stating that "[s]earches arising from the use of an automated profiling system
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nition, a prototype of the profiling system, known as the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) program, was
developed by Northwest Airlines with a grant from the FAA.68
On December 31, 1997, the FAA officially offered CAPS to all
major airlines with hopes that the airlines would eventually vol-
untarily adopt the system.6 9 Little is known about the specific
criteria CAPS draws upon in its profiling analysis because the
information contained in the profile is largely confidential to
prevent circumvention by terrorists; however, critics claim the
profiles will contain information regarding "each passenger's
travel history, identification information, whether the ticket was
purchased with cash or credit and with whom the passenger is
traveling. '70 The Gore Commission has called such screening
"positive profiling," as it seeks out those who meet beneficial cri-
teria in order to single out the terrorist.
7 1
The Gore Commission's Final Report provides that "[n] o pro-
file should contain or be based on material of a constitutionally
suspect nature-e.g., race, religion, national origin of U.S. citi-
zens."7 2 However, profiling systems have come under heavy crit-
icism by Arab and Muslim Americans, who claim that passenger
should be no more intrusive than search procedures that could be applied to all
passengers," the Gore Commission must have known that privacy issues could be
raised. Id.
68 See Michael Higgins, Looking the Part: With Criminal Profiles Being Used More
Widely to Spot Possible Terrorists and Drug Couriers, Claims of Bias Also on the Rise, 83
A.B.A. J. 48, 52 (1997)
69 See id. While airline adoption of CAPS might not occur immediately, the Air
Transport Association (ATA), a representative organization for the major air-
lines, defends CAPS as an important security component. See id.
70 Danitz, supra note 55, at 22.
71 Id. It is difficult to view the Gore Commission's asserted "positive profiling"
as anything but a wolf in sheep's clothing. I argue that singling out the potential
terrorist by removing those with beneficial criteria from suspect consideration is
tantamount to "negative profiling." In other words, a person will likely be cho-
sen as suspect due to some "negative" quality in his or her profile. See, e.g., Hig-
gins, supra note 70, at 52.
72 GORE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 19. The report further states:
Factors to be considered for elements of the profile should be
based on measurable, verifiable data indicating that the factors cho-
sen are reasonable predictors of risk, not stereotypes or generaliza-
tions. A relationship must be demonstrated between the factors
chosen and the risk of illegal activity .... Procedures for searching
the person or luggage of, or for questioning, a person who is se-
lected by the automated profiling system should be premised on
insuring respectful, non-stigmatizing, and efficient treatment of all
passengers.
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profiling discriminates against them by unfairly targeting them
for increased security scrutiny."v The American-Arab Anti-Dis-
crimination Committee and the Council on American-Islamic
Relations declared in separate statements that the profiling sys-
tem "has turned the Arab community into scapegoats."74
Houeida Saad, Director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimina-
tion Committee, claims her organization has received confiden-
tial documents from security manuals of various airlines,
containing discriminatory questions: "Are there stamps from
Arab countries in the passport?," "Does your customer have a
passport from a Middle East or Arab country?," and "Does your
customer have an Arab sounding name and were they born in
the Middle East or in an Arab country?"75 Such questions, civil
libertarians believe, reflect stereotypes that tend to single out
individuals who pose no real threat.76 According to the DOT,
no airline has been fined for discriminating in its screening of
passengers. 77 However, the DOT's Aviation Consumer Protec-
tion Division (ACPD) only began tracking complaints of biased
passenger searches in early 1997.78 Since that time, the ACPD
has fielded forty-six complaints.79
Lawsuits are beginning to be filed around the country by Arab
and Muslim Americans who claim their constitutional rights
were infringed upon due to these profiling systems. s0 For exam-
ple, Hassan and Julia Abbass, Cleveland, Ohio physicians, have
filed a four million dollar civil rights suit against U.S. Airways,
Inc. (USAir), claiming the airline wrongfully isolated them for
terrorist scrutiny because Hassan Abbass, a U.S. citizen born in
Syria, is an Arab-American."1 On May 24, 1997, USAir officials
singled out the Abbasses from approximately 200 St. Martin-
bound passengers for special scrutiny.8 2 The Abbasses claim the
73 See Abu-Nasr, supra note 57, at 7.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See Strossen, supra note 1, at 1. CAPS is partially intended as a solution to
these types of discriminatory questions because it only allows airline computers,
not airline officials, to evaluate passenger data. See Higgins, supra note 69, at 52.
FAA spokeswoman Rebecca Trexler stated, "'With this new system, [ticket agents]
would just look at their screen and see a red or a green-a stop or a go .... So
that automates the whole process. It takes the human element out."' Id.
77 See Higgins, supra note 70, at 52.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See Abu-Nasr, supra note 57, at 7.
81 See Higgins, supra note 70, at 48.
82 See id.
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airline staff escorted them through metal detectors, searched
their luggage, and tagged their bags with fluorescent labels read-
ing, "Positive I.D." 3 While the Abbasses did pass inspection,
they assert the other passengers looked at them cautiously; in
fact, some passengers rearranged their seating on the airplane
to avoid sitting next to the Abbasses.84 According to the
couple's attorney, USAir officials, when asked by Hassan Abbass
why the inspection was occurring, told him, "'Well, there are
these guidelines and you meet the guidelines."'8 5
3. Passenger-Bag Matching System
A security system related to the passenger profiling system in-
volves matching passengers with their bags to deter would-be
terrorists from purchasing an airline ticket only to check a piece
of luggage containing a bomb.8 6 The Gore Commission's Rec-
ommendation 3.24 states that "[n] o unaccompanied bag should
be transported on a passenger aircraft unless (1) it has been
screened by a screening method that meets the FAA standard,
or (2) it belongs to a passenger who at the time of check in was
neither randomly selected for security review nor selected by the
profile for further review. '8 7 Passenger-bag matching became
standard procedure for international flights after the explosion
of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland-an explosion
caused by a plastic explosive device contained in a bag checked
without the passenger actually boarding the plane.88
The new passenger-bag match procedures have come under
attack by two leading aviation lobbying groups, the Air Trans-
port Association (ATA) and Airport Council International-
North America (ACI-NA)."' While the groups claim that bag
matching is generally a good idea, they also state that requiring
full bag-matching without procedures and equipment in place




86 See James Ott, Profiling to Boost Security, But Funding Still an Issue, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., April 28, 1997, at 42.
87 GORE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 22.
88 See id.
89 See Nelms, supra note 14, at 33. The ATA is a lobbying group for commercial
airlines, while the ACI-NA lobbies for airports in North America.
90 See id.; See infra Part III.C.2. for a discussion of flight delays associated with
passenger-bag matching. The ATA and ACI-NA effectively argue that any delay
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C. COST IMPLICATIONS OF THE GORE COMMISSION
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Cost in Dollars
Gore Commission Recommendation 3.1 advises that approxi-
mately one hundred million dollars be devoted annually to en-
sure adequate aviation safety and hinted that more might be
needed.9 Among the funding options discussed by the Gore
Commission is a provision recommending an "aviation user se-
curity surcharge," which would impose a security tax on each
airline passenger.9 2 This security tax would coexist with other
federal funding obtained from other sources.93
The Gore Commission's recommendations raise serious ques-
tions regarding the availability of funding to carry out the
plan.94 While the Gore Commission recommendations put the
majority of the burden of payment for the system on the federal
government, the feeling in Washington is that airports and air-
lines will have to pay a major portion of the bill.95 This feeling is
supported by Anthony Broderick, the former chief of safety at
the FAA, who testified before the Senate Aviation Subcommit-
tee, addressing the Gore Commission's Recommendations.9"
Broderick testified that the FAA does not have adequate re-
sources to bring aviation security into the future.9" An airline
consultant, addressing the cost issues to air carriers of the Gore
Commission's recommendations, stated:
Inaccurate comments combined with knee-jerk action for the
sake of action, resulting in the grounding and possible demise of
an air carrier, and quick fix procedures without consideration of
benefit relative to cost, is detrimental and expensive .... The
loss of any air carrier under these circumstances is unacceptable.
resulting from passenger-bag matching compliance will hinder the profitability of
their constituents, the airlines, and North American airports.
91 GORE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 14.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 See Ott, supra note 88, at 42.
95 See Nelms, supra note 14, at 29; see also Asra Q. Nomani & Andy Pasztor, White
House Backs Plan for Air Safety, but Calls for no Big Increases for FAA, WALL ST.J., Feb.
13, 1997, at A20.
96 See FAA Funding Inadequate to Meet Requirements, Experts Say, AIR SAFETY WK.,
Mar. 10, 1997, at 1.
97 See id.
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The possible utilisation [sic] of $1.1 billion tax dollars on a one
in 8 million probability of incidence is at best questionable. 9
The ATA has held the position that, since it is the country that
is targeted in a terrorist attack, the country should be prepared
to pay to defend itself.99 ATA spokesperson David Fuscus stated
that "[w]e've long claimed that attacks on U.S. airlines are at-
tacks against the government, made for political reasons. The
airline is just a surrogate."'00
2. Cost in Delays
Time and flight delays are inevitable drawbacks to the new
Gore Commission recommendations. 10 1 Even though the bur-
den is likely to be significant due to security delays associated
with the new recommendations, this cost has not been explicitly
considered in any of the proposals endorsed by the Gore Com-
mission.10 2 The burden of increased delays is evidenced by sig-
nificant flight delays in countries that have rigorous aviation
security procedures in place. 10 3 For example, while Israel has
the most advanced security system in the world, passengers trav-
eling in Israel often spend three hours in the airport getting
their baggage and themselves inspected.10 4 A large number of
complaints have originated from the airlines, which complain
that passenger-bag matching will significantly delay boarding
procedures and therefore cause flight delays.10 5 David Fuscus,
spokesperson for the ATA, stated that, during peak times at Chi-
cago's O'Hare International Airport, twenty planes dock every
fifteen minutes. 06 Thousands of passengers rush to connecting
flights that leave, on the average, twenty-five minutes later.0 7
Tracking every bag, instead of containers of bags, Fuscus says,
would be "impossible."'0 According to a recent FAA study, de-
98 Knibb & Walker, supra note 46, at 40. (quoting Stephen McArdle, an airline
consultant employed by AvSolutions in Virginia, who believes that the Gore Com-
mission recommendations could force some airlines into bankruptcy courts).
99 See Nelms, supra note 14, at 33.
100 Id.
10, See Hahn, supra note 20, at 17.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 16-17.
104 See id at 16.
105 See Mark Fischetti, Defusing Airline Terrorism, TECH. REv., Apr. 1997, at 38,
43; see also Gore Commission Proposals Are A Mixed Bag, supra note 55, at 82.
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lays incurred from bag matching might cost the airlines more
than two billion dollars a year in lost revenues. 10 9 Some com-
mentators, however, believe the cost will be even more than two
billion dollars annually. 1 °
3. Cost in Lives
Some authorities have stated the Gore Commission's recom-
mendations could cost the lives of several Americans."' As air-
line ticket prices rise, which the Gore Commission concedes is
likely to occur as a result of its recommendations, the number of
persons traveling by air will correspondingly drop. 1 2 Those per-
sons displaced by the high cost of air travel usually travel by au-
tomobile; because the fatality rate is significantly higher on
American highways than in American airspace, the Gore Com-
mission could indirectly cause more deaths than would have
otherwise occurred but for its recommendations."' For exam-
ple, one recent study has hypothesized the effects of delays
caused by passenger-bag matching on the driving public.' 14 The
study conducted by Robert W. Hahn theorized that a one-hour
airline delay increase could lead to more than one hundred ad-
ditional road fatalities per year as annoyed and time-pressed fly-
ers drive instead of fly.
11 5
4. Cost in Wasted Effort
The extravagant cost of the implementation and the delays
that will inevitably be caused by the Gore Commission's recom-
mendations have caused some commentators to ask how safe is
safe enough. 6 An argument exists that air travel will always in-
109 See id.
110 See Hahn, supra note 20, at 17. Hahn states that "[t]hese delay-cost esti-
mates do not include the costs of hiring and training additional personnel, or
acquiring, installing, operating, and maintaining new equipment to comply with
the new mandates." Id.
M See Nelms, supra note 14, at 34; Hahn, supra note 20, at 17-18.
112 See Nelms, supra note 14, at 34.
113 See id. "The higher fatality rate of automobile travel will consequently lead
to an increase in overall fatalities." Hahn, supra note 20, at 18.
114 See Robert W. Hahn, Security Measures: A Cure Worse Than the Disease?, AVIA-
TION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 3, 1997, at 74.
115 See id. "This increase in road fatalities is likely to greatly exceed the number
of lives saved by instituting antiterrorist measures, thus resulting in a net increase
in overall fatalities." Id.
116 See Hahn, supra note 20, at 15; see also, Alexandra Marks, Air Safety: How
Much Is Enough?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 1, 1997, at 1; Knibb & Walker,
supra note 46, at 40.
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volve risks, and unless we ban air travel altogether, the risks will
be ever present." 17 In fact, some research tends to indicate that
air travel is safer than ever, despite heavy media coverage of air-
line disasters like TWA Flight 800.118 The Gore Commission
even recognizes the excellent safety record maintained by the
aviation industry:
Commercial aviation is the safest mode of transportation. That
record has been established not just through government regula-
tion, but through the work of everyone involved in aviation-
manufacturers, airlines, airport operators, and a highly-skilled
and dedicated workforce. Their combined efforts have pro-
duced a fatal accident rate of 0.3 per million departures in the
United States.119
Despite this assimilation, the Gore Commission seems to indi-
cate, by using language such as "[c] ost alone should not become
dispositive in deciding aviation safety and security rulemaking
issues,"'120 that a cost-benefit analysis is immaterial in setting
forth aviation safety and security standards. 12' The cost to the
passenger, however, might be determinative of whether that pas-
senger flies at all. 122 According to ATA figures, for every one
percent increase in airline ticket prices, passenger traffic drops
by one percent.1 23
IV. CONCLUSION
The choice between freedom or fear is contextual in our daily
lives. For the general public outside of the aviation setting, per-
haps antiterrorist regulation is appropriate to answer the fears
caused by the recent waive of domestic terrorism. The bomb-
ings of the World Trade Center and the Alfred P. Murrah Fed-
eral Building in Oklahoma City raised this fear, and the AEDPA
117 See Hahn, supra note 20, at 15.
118 See id.
119 GORE COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 5.
120 Id. at 8.
121 See Hahn, supra note 20, at 15-16. Cost-benefit analyses, while never popu-
lar, must be studied for the public good. See generally id. at 15 (stating that "[o]ne
of the most disturbing aspects of the [Gore Commission's] report is the lack of a
serious discussion of the costs and benefits of the recommendations"). If the
general public outside of the aviation infrastructure is more susceptible to a ter-
rorist attack, as I argue, our resources should be directed at preventing such an
attack. Similarly, if the greatest danger arising from air travel relates to mechani-
cal failure, then more funds should be directed towards minimizing that risk.
122 See Nelms, supra note 14, at 34.
123 See id.
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attempts to address it. While arguments exist as to the unconsti-
tutionality of the law, the legislation was likely appropriate.
Considering the vulnerability of the general public to a terrorist
attack, choosing to regulate, over choosing fear, seems to be the
more apropos solution.
The choice of fear over freedom, however, is unacceptable in
the mostly secure aviation infrastructure. Air travel was the saf-
est form of transportation before July 17, 1996, when 230 pas-
sengers on TWA Flight 800 perished over Long Island. Nothing
has changed. Air travel continues to be, and always will be, the
safest form of transportation. The death of 230 individuals gave
birth to antiterrorist governmental activity, embodied in the
Gore Commission, which has done absolutely nothing to com-
bat the real cause of those deaths: mechanical failure. The Gore
Commission's irrational goal was to make the safest mode of
travel even safer, despite the many costs involved.
At some point, Americans must answer the question: "How
safe is enough?" As a society, we have an integral choice to
make. We can choose to succumb to fear and live in a country
where we are treated as prisoners when we choose to fly. Con-
versely, we can choose to enjoy our freedoms when we travel by
air. We can be free to maintain our dignity, self-respect, and
privacy by not being subjected to a "virtual strip search" by state-
of-the-art bomb-screening equipment. We can be free to not be
singled out and embarrassed by our government personnel and
government-empowered personnel by not falling victim to a dis-
criminatory passenger profile. Moreover, we can be free to not
have our precious personal and governmental resources allo-
cated to an already adequate system by rejecting the costly Gore
Commission proposals. The choice is ours to make. The choice
is clear.
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